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NO. 26 JUNE 2019  Introduction 
Partnership on the High Seas 
China and Russia’s Joint Naval Manoeuvres 
Michael Paul 
On the occasion of the 70th founding anniversary of China’s national navy, a big naval 
parade with more than 30 Chinese ships sailed off the coast of Qingdao. A few days 
later, on 29 April 2019, the “Joint Sea 2019” Russian-Chinese bilateral naval exercise 
began. In numbers, China’s navy now has the world’s biggest fleet – also thanks to 
decades of Russian naval armament. From Beijing’s point of view, however, the Chi-
nese armed forces have a serious shortcoming: a lack of operational experience. Here, 
too, Moscow fills some gaps. Since the first joint manoeuvre in 2005, cooperation has 
increased at many levels. Sino-Russian sea manoeuvres now also serve as a menacing 
signal of support for China’s claims in the South China Sea or in the Sino-Japanese 
disputes in the East China Sea. Moscow and Beijing use the joint naval exercises to set 
geopolitical signals. Despite all historic mistrust, Sino-Russian cooperation seems to 
rest on a relatively stable foundation of partnership. But maritime cooperation and 
coordinated partnership must not lead to an alliance. 
 
Joint exercises benefit China in various 
ways. The country primarily wants to 
secure its long sea routes because the ex-
port-orientation of China’s economy makes 
it increasingly dependent on and vulner-
able to maritime security. China is also the 
world’s largest importer of crude oil. Its 
navy is therefore supposed to secure trade 
and energy supplies. It has a lot of catching 
up to do when it comes to operating in seas 
beyond its own coastal region. China has 
been involved in anti-piracy operations in 
the Horn of Africa since 2008, but apart 
from that, the navy has little experience 
with operations outside Asia. Maritime co-
operation with Russia helps China imple-
ment its maritime strategy, enhance mari-
time security, and develop capabilities for 
“offshore operations”. 
Chinese and Russian armed forces have 
now carried out more than 25 bilateral, 
increasingly complex joint exercises in 
which naval, land, and air assets were com-
bined. Bilateral exercises at sea began in 
2012, signalling similar geopolitical am-
bitions and promoting the implementation 
of maritime strategies. In addition, bilateral 
military exercises enable a process of learn-
ing and the exchange of operational and 
strategic concepts. They can both demon-
strate military readiness and enhance op-
erational experience, thus improving 
operational flexibility and readiness for 
future deployments. Geographically, the 
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exercises have covered different sea areas, 
with each country acting as host in differ-
ent waters. 
Three of the exercises took place in the 
Chinese home region: in the Yellow Sea 
(2012), in the East China Sea (2014), and in 
the South China Sea (2016). Four exercises 
were carried out in Russian operational 
areas: in the Mediterranean Sea (2015), in 
the Baltic Sea (2017), and in the Sea of 
Okhotsk (2017). Several Sino-Russian ma-
noeuvres have also been held in an area 
where both have strategic interests, namely 
the Sea of Japan (2013, 2015, 2017). On 29 
April, “Joint Sea 2019” started on China’s 
Yellow Sea coast as the latest iteration of 
the annual naval exercise. 
Manoeuvres in the 
Chinese Home Region 
The joint exercises began in April 2012 in 
the Yellow Sea, a marginal sea of the Pacific 
Ocean largely surrounded by China and the 
Korean Peninsula. The Bohai Gulf belongs 
Chinese-Russian naval exercises since 2012 
Year Date Host – Operational Area Scope 
2012 22–27 April China – Yellow Sea China: 18 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 13 aircraft, 
5 helicopters 
Russia: 7 warships (incl. 3 suppliers), 4 helicopters 
2013 5–12 July Russia – Sea of Japan China: 9 warships (incl. 2 submarines, 1 supplier), 
3 helicopters 
Russia: 13 warships (incl. submarine), 3 aircraft, 
2 helicopters 
2014 20–26 May China – East China Sea China: 8 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 7 aircraft, 
4 helicopters 
Russia: 6 warships, 2 aircraft 
2015  11–21 May Russia – Mediterranean Sea China: 2 frigates and 1 supply vessel 
Russia: 2 warships 
 20–28 August Russia – Sea of Japan China: 7 warships, 5 aircraft, 6 helicopters, 21 am-
phibious vehicles 
Russia: 18 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 3 aircraft, 
9 amphibious vehicles 
2016 12–20 September China – South China Sea China: 12 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 11 aircraft, 
8 helicopters 
Russia: 5 warships (incl. 2 suppliers), 2 helicopters and 
amphibious vehicles 
2017 21–28 July Russia – Baltic Sea Altogether 13 warships with helicopters (Ka-27) and 
bombers (Su-24) 
 18–25 September Russia – Sea of Japan and 
Sea of Okhotsk 
A total of 13 warships (incl. 2 submarines), 4 on-board 
helicopters, and 4 submarine combat aircraft (ASWs) 
2018 11–17 September Russia Large manoeuvre “Vostok 2018” with tactical naval 
exercises 
2019 29 April – 4 May China – Yellow Sea and 
East China Sea 
China: 7 warships (incl. submarine) 
Russia: 5 warships (incl. submarine) 
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to the Yellow Sea and forms the sea-side 
access to Beijing, in the south of the East 
China Sea. The United States regularly 
deploys ships in these waters and conducted 
annual exercises with South Korea for 
decades until President Donald Trump 
suspended them in 2018. These manoeu-
vres, repeatedly criticised by China, were 
one of the reasons for the start of Sino-
Russian exercises in 2012. With 25 war-
ships, China and Russia demonstrated their 
strength in geostrategic competition with 
the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, 
also against the background of the endur-
ing North Korea conflict. 
Led by the flagship of the Russian Pacific 
Fleet, a convoy entered the East China Sea 
on 18 May 2014. The ships moored in the 
Wusung naval port near Shanghai. This 
marked the beginning of another joint fleet 
manoeuvre. The presence of presidents Vla-
dimir Putin and Xi Jinping underlined the 
importance of the exercises. Beijing had 
previously declared its support for Russia’s 
stance in the Ukraine crisis; Moscow had 
assured its support for contentious Chinese 
claims. The latter refer to the Japan-con-
trolled Senkaku Islands, which China claims 
as the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese navy’s 
operations in the waters around the Sen-
kaku/Diaoyu Islands have increased since 
Japan violated the status quo – from a 
Chinese point of view – and placed the 
islands under its own administration. In 
2012, seven Chinese warships had passed 
the Miyako Strait. China thus indicated to 
Japan that its navy would extend its forces 
to the Pacific to “defensively protect” for-
eign trade and oil routes, as Chinese admiral 
Yin Zhuo explained. The “Air Defence 
Identification Zone”, proclaimed by China 
in 2013, was another sign that Beijing 
wanted to take control of the East China 
Sea. In April 2014, the largest amphibious 
manoeuvre to date between the United 
States and South Korea took place on 
Korea’s south-east coast. The Sino-Russian 
manoeuvres in May 2014 demonstrated the 
ability and willingness of both naval powers 
to maintain a strong stance in East Asian 
waters. Joint exercises on the high seas were 
conducted with mixed formations of ships 
and included missile and artillery strikes 
against sea targets from various distances 
and defence against submarine attacks. 
In the South China Sea joint sea manoeu-
vres focussing on amphibious operations 
were conducted in 2016. China claims nearly 
90 per cent of the South China Sea, includ-
ing the Paracel Islands (occupied by China 
since 1974, claimed by Vietnam) and the 
Spratly Islands (some occupied by China, 
but disputed with Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam, and disputed with 
Brunei and Indonesia as regards territorial 
waters). The naval manoeuvres in Septem-
ber 2016 took place two months after The 
Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration 
rejected China’s claims. From the court’s 
point of view, the “historical” rights de-
clared by China did not justify territorial 
claims, and none of the features in the 
Spratlys qualify them as “islands”, accord-
ing to maritime law. In addition, the court 
had criticised the creation of artificial 
islands. President Putin declared before the 
start of the exercise that Russia supported 
China’s position in not recognising the 
ruling from The Hague. The establishment 
and militarisation of artificial outposts by 
China had aroused international protest. 
Russia strengthened China’s back with its 
willingness to engage in joint military ma-
noeuvres in the area. The “demonstration 
of unity” had a special quality, as it in-
cluded amphibious operations, that is, it 
was intended to deter neighbouring states 
with similar claims. China sent the largest 
contingent, including state-of-the-art war-
ships (052C and 052B destroyers and three 
054A frigates). Russia sent two of its largest 
but oldest destroyers from its Pacific Fleet. 
Both communicated for the first time via a 
common command information system. 
Manoeuvres in the 
Russian Home Region 
After all the exercises had taken place in 
the Pacific, China signalled its support for 
Russia by sending its ships in the Mediter-
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ranean and visiting the Russian Black Sea 
coast in May 2015, although Crimea itself 
had not been visited. Its annexation had 
triggered international protest and sanc-
tions and isolated Russia. By announcing 
that they would be holding joint exercises 
in the South China Sea in 2016, Beijing and 
Moscow linked the two highly controversial 
processes in the spirit of mutual support. 
Russia returned to the Mediterranean in 
2015 as a maritime power. This included 
not only the reactivation of the traditional 
base in Sevastopol on the south-western tip 
of Crimea, but also of the Russian naval 
base in the Syrian port of Tartu. This is the 
only naval base for Russian warships in the 
Mediterranean and the only military base of 
the Russian Federation in “distant foreign 
countries”. Russia mainly sent ships of the 
Black Sea Fleet into the exercise, which tra-
ditionally operates in the Mediterranean 
Sea from Sevastopol, as the Imperial Rus-
sian Navy used to. 
China, for its part, demonstrated blue-sea 
capabilities and emerging interests of its 
own in the Mediterranean. In the Belt and 
Road Initiative – China’s multidimensional 
foreign and economic policy instrument – 
the Greek port of Piraeus has geopolitical 
significance as an important part of the 
maritime Silk Road. In 2016, the state-
owned Chinese shipping company COSCO 
took over 51 per cent of the port company 
and intends to acquire a further 16 per cent 
of the shares in 2021. Piraeus is intended 
to serve as the logistical bridgehead for 
China’s activities in Europe. 
In July 2017, China came surprisingly 
close to one of the most turbulent fault 
lines in the East-West relationship. For the 
first time, a Chinese ship convoy – accom-
panied by 18 Russian ships of the Baltic 
Fleet – carried out manoeuvres in the Bal-
tic Sea. The warships met in the waters off 
the enclave of Kaliningrad. Afterwards, the 
Chinese ships continued their voyage to 
St. Petersburg. Some observers spoke of it as 
being a signal from Beijing, which wanted 
to be perceived as a great naval power, 
and also as a gesture of support for Russia, 
which was isolated from the West. Others 
saw it as Beijing’s response to the presence 
of British and French ships in its own mari-
time backyard, the South China Sea. 
In the second half of 2017, the sea ma-
noeuvres continued in the Sea of Japan. 
They were then extended to the north, into 
the Sea of Okhotsk, which lies between the 
Kuril Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula 
in the North Pacific. From the Russian point 
of view, such manoeuvres support the legal 
claim to the Sea of Okhotsk, which Moscow 
closed in 2014 for foreign shipping and 
fishing following a decision by the Commis-
sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
Some argued that this could strengthen Chi-
nese efforts in the South China Sea to pur-
sue its own interpretation of the Law of the 
Sea for that area. 
A similar common interest was shown in 
the exercises in the Sea of Japan, which lies 
between the Japanese archipelago, the Rus-
sian island of Sakhalin, and the Korean Pen-
insula. Geostrategically, this sea space is 
as important for China as it is for Russia, 
which has in Vladivostok its home port for 
the Russian Pacific Fleet. This can be seen 
from the fact that three exercises took place 
in the area between 2013 and 2017. With 
their manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan, Rus-
sia and China were sending a clear message 
to Japan, especially after the exercise in 
2013, when five Chinese ships first crossed 
the Soya Strait between Hokkaido in north-
ern Japan and the Russian island of Sakha-
lin. The 2015 exercises included amphibi-
ous operations, which was also an unmis-
takable signal to Tokyo in the context of the 
island disputes with Beijing and Moscow. 
Such complex operations also demonstrate 
the high level of maritime cooperation. 
China’s and Russia’s 
Maritime Capability Profiles: 
Unequal Partners 
While China is eager to establish a sphere 
of influence in what it calls the San Hai, 
or “Three Seas” – the South China Sea, the 
East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea – the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy is de-
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veloping capabilities for offshore operation, 
that is, the high seas. The concurrent objec-
tives are securing maritime interests (the 
protection of sea lines of communication, 
the realisation of territorial claims in the 
maritime periphery, and finally naval 
supremacy in the Western Pacific) and the 
security of the communist regime. General 
Liu Huaqing, as Commander of the Navy 
(1982–1987), used the national interest in 
maritime resources as an argument for 
building a modern navy. The national goal 
of recovering “lost territories” in the South 
China Sea also served at that time to justify 
the transition in doctrine from coastal 
defence to “active defence”. The develop-
ment of the maritime strategy was further 
advanced by experiences in the 1990s, 
when the Beijing leadership had to recog-
nise the weaknesses of its armed forces, 
especially during the crisis in the Taiwan 
Strait in 1995/96.  
In just over two decades, the PLA navy 
has mustered one of the mightiest navies 
in the world. In numbers, China now has 
the world’s biggest fleet. It is also growing 
faster than any other major navy. The num-
ber of ships or the total tonnage is useful 
for assessing the capabilities of a fleet in 
relation to its tasks. However, it is not suf-
ficient to compare its capabilities with 
those of another navy, such as that of the 
United States. Today, the Chinese navy has 
more than 300 warships, whereas the num-
ber of US ships in recent years has been 
between 270 and 290. Now China wants to 
enable its naval forces more quickly for far-
seas operations and build more destroyers, 
frigates, and submarines. By 2030, it is 
estimated that the PLA navy will consist 
of up to 550 naval assets: 450 surface ships 
and 99 submarines. More and more, the 
Chinese navy will become equal to the US 
navy, both quantitatively and even qualita-
tively, if armament, training, and maritime 
exercises are continued as before. But only 
years after the end of the modernisation 
process in 2035 will the capabilities of Chi-
na’s navy on the high seas and in the highly 
complex operation of aircraft carrier groups 
come close to those of the US navy. 
After a quite successful military reform, 
Russia has efficient, battle-tested armed 
forces, but it has declined as a maritime 
power. Moscow therefore declares the 
return of its navy to the ranks of the lead-
ing naval powers as a national goal. To this 
end, the Arctic and the Atlantic are to form 
operational focal points. The annexation of 
Crimea, and thus the regaining of the sea-
port Sevastopol, also improved the ability to 
be present in the Mediterranean. According 
to the new naval doctrine of July 2017, 
naval forces are to be created that can also 
operate in distant areas of the world’s 
oceans. They are intended to prevent the 
dominance of the US navy and other naval 
powers and to secure second place in the 
world (“by combat characteristics”) for their 
own navy. In quantitative terms, however, 
the Russian navy is already in third place. 
While China has two aircraft carriers and 
a third is under construction, the only Rus-
sian carrier, “Admiral Kuznetsov”, was 
called the “most marauded warship in the 
world”. Only a quarter of the Russian fleet 
of more than 200 ships – mainly made 
up of Soviet-era surface ships – are fit for 
blue-water operations. Only in the construc-
tion and operation of submarines does 
Russia remain a peer leader – and thus in 
a position to put the US navy and NATO’s 
anti-submarine capabilities under pressure.  
From the “Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership of 
Coordination” to the Alliance? 
Moscow and Beijing came together in the 
early 1990s under similarly difficult con-
ditions. The violent suppression of the 
uprising on Tiananmen Square in June 
1989 had massively damaged China’s repu-
tation in the world. The European Union 
and the United States imposed an arms 
embargo, which is still in force today. 
Russia suffered from the consequences of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
In this phase of weakness, both wanted to 
counter the growing influence of the United 
States. This effort to restore a balance of 
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power (“balancing”) is a central explanation 
for the emergence of alliances, according to 
classical alliance theory. 
After the first reciprocal state visits in 
1992 and 1994, a “Strategic Coordination 
Partnership” was declared in April 1996. 
This was followed by a “Joint Declaration 
on a Multipolar World and the Creation 
of a New International Order” in 1997 and 
a “Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and 
Friendly Cooperation” in 2001, in which 
consultations were agreed in the event that 
either side saw its security interests being 
threatened. The last border disputes were 
settled in 2004. In January 2017, in China’s 
White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Co-
operation Policy, Russia was described as a 
“priority in diplomacy”. In December 2017, 
the Chinese Ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, 
declared that the “comprehensive strategic 
partnership of coordination” between 
China and Russia had a special position in 
diplomacy with major powers. And Russian 
President Putin explained in April 2019: 
“Our military and military-technical co-
operation points to the high level of trust. 
Russia and China hold regular joint exer-
cises and share our accumulated experience 
in military development.” 
Contrary to the official characterisation 
of China and Russia as equal partners, Chi-
na’s dominant role in economic relations, 
which will presumably continue to develop 
to Russia’s disadvantage in the coming 
decades, is becoming clear. Moreover, China 
is not as dependent on Russian energy sup-
plies as Russia is on China as a buyer and 
investor in the energy sector. However, 
there is (still) one decisive exception to the 
rule of Chinese superiority, namely Russia’s 
experience as a military power. Russia con-
tinues to have an operational and techno-
logical lead in important areas of naval 
warfare, such as submarine operations, the 
use of long-range bombers at sea, and mine 
warfare. Whereas manoeuvres in the past 
were often limited to anti-terrorist exer-
cises, they now include combined air de-
fence, missile and artillery operations, anti-
submarine warfare, and amphibious opera-
tions. In 2017, a Chinese lifeboat docked 
with a Russian submarine for the first time. 
And the interaction is still growing, as can 
be seen from the fact that Chinese airborne 
reconnaissance now regularly transmit data 
to Russian ships. Only in the nuclear do-
main does Russia remain on par with the 
United States and superior to China. But 
here, too, Beijing is likely to expect support 
from Moscow in the construction of stra-
tegic submarines, among other things. 
Pragmatic cooperation is beneficial for 
both because it avoids the uneasy com-
promise between obligation and sovereign-
ty. Therefore, a formal alliance is unneces-
sary – an alliance with a guarantee of 
military assistance in times of conflict can 
even negatively affect relations with other 
countries and harm one’s own political 
interests. In the event of a crisis or conflict, 
the alliance partner would limit the range 
of political options, while the appearance of 
a Sino-Russian military alliance could have a 
threatening – and even escalating – effect. 
Moreover, they are unequal partners with 
different goals. The dream of the great re-
juvenation of the Chinese nation virtually 
prohibits voluntary self-restriction, as would 
be required by an alliance. Russia’s role as 
a great power, on the other hand, benefits 
from the partnership because it underscores 
that Russia is not just a regional power. In 
the long term, only Beijing is able to con-
tain its common rival, the United States, 
and the transatlantic alliance. This is an 
advantage for Moscow, which is why it has 
“fed the dragon”. In this respect, the Krem-
lin is nolens volens striving less for balancing 
than for leaning towards a state with higher 
power potential (“bandwagoning”). An 
alliance would make it even clearer that 
both are not equal partners. 
Perspectives 
With its ongoing naval modernisation pro-
gramme, Beijing has long since overtaken 
Moscow, both in claiming a leading role as 
a great maritime power and in its imple-
mentation. Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Russia has failed to restore its blue-
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water fleet. Instead, the navy usually 
navigates in the brown-water areas of the 
Atlantic’s and Pacific’s marginal seas, 
securing its interests in the “near abroad”. 
China, on the other hand, will expand its 
global naval capabilities. Two aircraft car-
riers, additional type 055 guided weapon 
destroyers, and smaller warships are to be 
completed in the next years. Russia has a 
combination of small warships such as 
frigates and corvettes as well as submarines 
equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles. These 
are suitable for threatening land targets up 
to 2,000 kilometres away, as was the case in 
the Syrian conflict. Moscow therefore has 
respectable naval capabilities to safeguard 
its national security interests, and its 
modernisation projects will enhance blue-
water capabilities, even though it will not 
be able to project global maritime power 
like China in the future. 
Russia uses the joint exercises as an alter-
native means of projecting power, whereas 
China uses them to advance and implement 
its own naval strategy. China’s rise as a 
naval power is to be seen as part of an ex-
traordinary transformation. In modern his-
tory, it is the only example of a land power 
becoming a hybrid land and sea power. The 
fact that a land power develops sea power 
touches the established sea power’s most 
sensitive nerve. But so far, China has con-
sistently adhered to this highly complex, 
quite expensive, and risky geostrategy. 
In addition to military-technical coopera-
tion and military-to-military dialogue, mili-
tary exercises have established themselves 
as an important element in further develop-
ing the partnership. In August 2005, almost 
10,000 Chinese and Russian soldiers from 
the air force and navy took part in the first 
major joint manoeuvre, the “peace mis-
sion”. In view of the smouldering Taiwan 
crisis, this first joint manoeuvre already had 
considerable political significance. Over 
time, the manoeuvres became more diverse 
and complex. However, it remains uncer-
tain whether some exercises for air defence 
and submarine combat were carefully 
orchestrated so as to guarantee the safety 
of crews and ships or rather to not expose 
themselves to the partner navy. Maybe only 
deficiencies should be concealed. 
Nevertheless, the Russian navy is a 
valuable model for China. The shortage of 
surface vessels is compensated by distrib-
uting cruise missiles across the fleet, in-
cluding submarines, thereby significantly 
increasing combat strength. The continued 
proliferation of offensive missile capabili-
ties among ships and submarines remains 
perhaps the most significant new develop-
ment of Russia’s naval capabilities, also in 
terms of an effective anti-access/area denial 
strategy (A2/AD). Complementary to this, 
the Chinese navy is the world leader in the 
maritime deployment of ballistic missiles. 
Politically sensitive areas not only proved 
to be no obstacle to joint exercises, but 
seem to be part of the planning because 
they gave them higher symbolic value. The 
2014 manoeuvres took place in the East 
China Sea at a time when the Sino-Japanese 
island disputes threatened to escalate. Dur-
ing the exercises in the Black Sea in 2015, 
Europe was still shocked by Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea. The 2016 manoeuvres were 
held in the South China Sea, where the 
militarisation of newly erected Chinese out-
posts was just beginning. 
Are Russia and China on the way to a 
military alliance, or are they simply using 
a mutually beneficial partnership? In fact, 
neither the functionality of military co-
operation nor its potential should be under-
estimated. Attention should focus not only 
on China and Russia as individual coun-
tries, but also on the impact of their evolv-
ing military partnership. In the end, the 
respective self-interest does not necessarily 
make Moscow and Beijing allies. Even with-
out formal alliance relations, they enjoy 
advantages that otherwise only close allies 
do, as illustrated by the Vostok exercises in 
2018. These include a learning process on 
both sides as well as a certain degree of 
interoperability that – as in NATO – is 
only viable so long as it is maintained and 
practised. 
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Russia seems more concerned with main-
taining strategic nuclear capabilities as well 
as ground and air forces for operations in 
the “near abroad” than rebuilding its fleets. 
China, as a rising maritime power with ex-
tensive economic interests around the globe, 
is building a blue-water navy with carrier 
groups and expeditionary capabilities. 
A “degree of mutual complementarity 
between the two militaries” does not auto-
matically mean military engagement in the 
event of conflict. But the combination of 
Russian combat experience and advanced 
strategic weapons with Chinese sea power 
makes a quite impressive force. 
It is up to Beijing to enhance strategic 
stability by creating transparency in its 
naval strategy and future fleet armament. 
Beyond maritime arms control, not only 
Brussels and Washington, but also Moscow 
and Beijing must be interested in confi-
dence- and security-building measures to 
avoid crisis instability, even if their chances 
of success currently can be regarded as 
quite low. 
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